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Peer Influence on Payout Policies 
 
Abstract 
Using a large sample of US public companies, we find robust evidence that firms’ payout 
policies, i.e., dividends and share repurchases, are significantly influenced by the policies of their 
industry peers. To overcome endogeneity problems, we employ instrumental variable techniques 
based on peers’ stock price shocks. Peer influence on payouts is more pronounced among firms 
that face greater product market competition and operate in better information environments. 
With regards to dividends, firms, especially smaller and younger firms, are more sensitive to 
industry peers that are similar to them in size and age. However, mimicking repurchases is 
concentrated among large and mature firms only. Peer influence on dividends, compared to 
repurchases, seems more stable across firm and industry conditions. Overall, peer influence on 
dividends, and, to a less extent, on repurchases, is consistent with a rivalry-based theory of 
imitation, which posits that firms imitate peers’ actions to maintain their competitive parity.  
JEL: G35 
Keywords: Payout Policy; Dividend policy; Share Repurchases; Peer effects; Mimicking; 
Imitation 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064848 
1 
 
Peer Influence on Payout Policies 
“Virtually all board and senior management analysis related to dividend decisions starts with 
in-depth peer benchmarking.” 
- Dividends: The 2011 Guide to Dividend Policy Trends and Best Practices (J. P. Morgan) 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic theory suggests that individuals and firms often have incentives to imitate each 
other. Duflo and Saez (2002) find that individuals’ retirement savings behaviors are highly 
influenced by their peers. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that managers can sometimes avoid 
negative reputations by ignoring their private information and imitating the actions of others. By 
imitating, managers who are concerned about their reputations in the labor market send signals to 
others about their own quality. Surveys of corporate executives also have found that managers 
consider peer firms’ decisions when choosing their own firms’ policies (see, e.g., Graham and 
Harvey (2001)). Lieberman and Asaba (2006) review large literature on imitation and propose 
two broad theories of why firms imitate each other: 1) information-based theory, which suggests 
that firms follow other firms that are perceived to have superior information, and 2) rivalry-based 
theory, which suggests that firms imitate their rivals to maintain competitive parity or limit 
rivalry.  
Despite ample theoretical support and anecdotal evidence of peer influence, empirical 
research on the causal effect of peer firms on corporate policies is rather limited. A notable 
exception is a recent study by Leary and Roberts (2014), who show that corporate capital 
structure choices are highly interdependent, and that peers’ capital structure is the most important 
observable determinant of a firm’s capital structure. Patnam (2011) finds positive industry peer 
effects in investment and R&D among Indian public companies. In related work, Fracassi (2016) 
finds that managers are influenced by their social peers when making corporate policy choices. 
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In this paper, we examine whether firms are influenced by their industry peers’ policies 
when making payout policies such as whether to pay and how much to pay via dividends or 
share repurchases. Finance research acknowledges the importance of peers in payout (and other) 
policies, mainly by including industry fixed-effects and industry averages in empirical models. 
However, the literature has yet to establish that peers have a causal effect on a firm’s payout 
policy. Most studies implicitly assume that firms make their decisions in isolation, only based on 
firm-specific characteristics. So an examination of peer effects can add to our knowledge about 
how firms set payout polices. For example, evidence of peer effects may imply that managers’ 
hands are effectively tied when a firm’s peers pay dividends, causing investors to expect the firm 
to do the same. In fact, based on a survey of corporate managers, Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely (2005) point to this possibility by concluding that “With respect to payout policy, the 
rules of the game include … do not deviate far from the competitors; …” (p. 523). Moreover, an 
understanding of peer effects may help answer why dividends tend to be so persistent, and 
whether this tendency to conform to industry peers snowballs into the phenomena of 
disappearing and reappearing dividends, and their concentration, found by previous studies (see, 
e.g., Fama and French (2001), Hoberg and Prabhala (2008), Julio and Ikenberry (2004), and 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004)). 
Payouts are one of the most important decisions made by a firm, and cash dividends have 
been the primary payout method for centuries. Theoretical literature gives ample explanation for 
why firms may imitate each other’s payout policies. Perhaps the strongest theoretical support for 
mimicking dividends comes from an inertia-based explanation of dividends.1 The original 
purpose of dividends was to make stocks easy to price by making them comparable to debt 
because dividends provide the most direct statistic for firm valuation. The sheer popularity of 
dividend discount models in finance textbooks speaks to the importance of dividends as an 
important metric for stock valuation. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that dividends are 
perceived as valuable by both retail investors (see, e.g., Graham and Kumar (2006)) and 
institutional investors (see, e.g., Ben-David, Glushkov, and Moussawi (2010)). Not surprisingly, 
practitioners and analysts commonly cite dividend payouts as a measure of valuation, especially 
                                                            
1 See Ben-David (2010) for a review of this literature.  
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when comparing firms in the same industry.2 This ‘valuation-as-yardstick’ concept proposes that 
firms manage their dividends in order to help investors value their stream of cash flows by 
making the firm comparable to their peers. Consequently, when these firms compete in capital 
markets, they have strong motivations to react to each other’s dividend policies.  
A prediction from the ‘valuation-as-yardstick’ concept is that dividend changes are 
correlated within industries. If investors use the same dividend yield to price firms within an 
industry, a change in dividend payout by one firm is expected to be followed with payout 
changes in the same direction by peer firms who like to remain comparable to peers. This notion 
is supported by Firth’s (1996) finding that a dividend announcement by a firm also affects the 
valuations of other firms in its industry.  
Alternatively, signaling motivations also provide a plausible explanation for mimicking 
behavior. Lintner (1956) argues that a dividend increase signals management’s belief that 
earnings are going to increase. Signaling theory argues that owing to asymmetric information, 
dividends are explicit signals about future earnings, sent intentionally by management to 
shareholders (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979, Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985)). 
Empirical evidence also supports that firms pay dividends in order to convey information to 
shareholders (see, e.g., DeAngelo, De Angelo and Skinner (1996), and Benartzi, Michaely and 
Thaler (1997)). Clearly, to the extent that (1) dividends are effective signals that attract investors’ 
attention and (2) firms compete with each other for this positive attention, they have an incentive 
to mimic peer firms’ dividend policies. Moreover, this incentive to mimic is likely to be stronger 
among firms in more competitive industries, in which it is more difficult to differentiate the firm 
based on products. It is also likely to be more pronounced among younger firms, which do not 
have an established history of operations and have a greater need to be comparable with peers in 
order to obtain favorable valuations. 
                                                            
2 Consider the following excerpt from a U.S. News & World Report story: “Yes, Apple already 
pays a dividend. That’s true. But it’s also a shamelessly insufficient dividend. … While on the 
surface MSFT’s [Microsoft’s] 2.5 percent dividend is comparable to Apple’s 2.1 percent yield, 
using the payout ratio exposes just how different the shareholder capital return philosophies 
are.” Why Apple (AAPL) Needs to Double Its Dividend Immediately (Aug. 16, 2016, 
http://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-08-15/apple-inc-aapl-stock-dividend-could-
double) 
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On the other hand, share repurchases have become an increasing important method of 
payout. In fact, the decrease in dividends is almost entirely substituted by an increase in share 
repurchases (see Grullon et al. (2011)), and firms often substitute one form of payout with the 
other depending on investors’ preferences and market conditions (see Li and Lie (2006)). In 
addition, Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007) show that firms sometimes strategically mimic 
repurchase decisions of other firms to signal their competitiveness to the market.   
Consistent with these predictions, we find that a firm’s decisions on whether to start 
paying dividends, how much dividend to pay, and whether and how much to repurchase are 
significantly influenced by those of its industry peers. To overcome endogeneity concerns, we 
follow Leary and Roberts (2014) and employ an instrumental variables (IV) technique. We use 
industry peers’ idiosyncratic stock return shocks and idiosyncratic risks as instruments for peers’ 
dividend policies. Results from IV regressions indicate that peer firms have a causal effect on 
both payout policies – dividends and repurchases. While the ability to repurchase shares enables 
firms to deflect peer pressure to initiate dividends, share repurchases do not significantly affect 
peer pressure on the amount of dividend subsequent to dividend initiation. 
Finally, we examine the heterogeneity in peer effects to better understand the reasons 
behind peer influence on payouts. We find that peer influence on both forms of payout is 
stronger among firms that face more intense product market competition. In general, peers are 
more influential to firms that are of similar size and age as themselves. Smaller and younger 
firms are especially more influenced by their peers’ dividend policies, but mimicking 
repurchases is concentrated among larger and mature firms. Moreover, peer influence on 
dividend is more pronounced among firms that operate in better information environments, i.e., 
firms in industries that are followed by more analysts and where stock trading conveys less 
private information. These patterns collectively support the rivalry-based motive for mimicking 
proposed by Lieberman and Asaba (2006). Our findings do not provide strong support for the 
signaling motive for mimicking payouts.3 Finally, we find that the announcement effects of 
                                                            
3 This conclusion is consistent with Leary and Michaely’s (2011) inference that the evidence of 
dividend smoothing does not support a signaling motive, and Brav et al. (2005)’s survey 
evidence that managers reject the notion that they pay dividends to signal firm quality. 
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dividend increases are more positive when the resulting dividend is close to peers, but no similar 
pattern is evident for dividend decreases. This asymmetry does not appear to be caused by time 
variation in the premium that investors attach to dividends (see Li and Lie (2006)). 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to identify the causal effect of peer 
firms on a firm’s payout policies. The closest study to ours is a concurrent working paper by 
Popadak (2017), who analyzes peer effects in the context of Lintner’s partial-adjustment model 
of dividends. Our paper differs from Popadak’s in several ways. First, unlike Popadak, we 
examine dividend initiation, which is a more important decision than dividend continuation 
because once firms start paying dividends, they rarely stop. Second, while Popadak finds no 
evidence of a peer effect in repurchases, we find a strong effect of peers in the decision to 
repurchase as well as the amount of repurchases.4 Third, we examine potential interactions 
between dividends and share repurchases, which Popadak does not. Finally, because existing 
theories of dividends such as signaling are not supported by previous empirical and field studies 
(see, e.g., Leary and Michaely (2011), and Brav et al. (2005)), we seek explanations of peer 
influence on payout from theories beyond the finance literature. We find that peer influence on 
dividends fits a simple but well-founded rivalry-based theory of mimicking proposed by 
Lieberman and Asaba (2006). 
This work is related to important prior research by Leary and Roberts (2014), who find 
that capital structure choices within an industry are highly interdependent, and Fracassi (2016) 
and Patnam (2011), who show that related firms make correlated financial choices. Our paper 
also complements Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007), who find that repurchase decisions are 
correlated within an industry, but attempt to establish causality indirectly via cross-sectional tests 
only. Our paper offers cleaner evidence of a causal effect (i.e., mimicking, rather than a response 
to common industry shocks) by using well-established instrumental variables that are plausibly 
independent of common industry shocks. Additionally, our paper examines potential 
                                                            
4 This difference in our results may be because Popadak analyzes quarterly data, while we 
examine annual data. Since firms usually repurchase shares out of temporary cash flows (see 
Jagannathan, et al. (2000), which tend to be sporadic, looking for a peer effect in repurchases 
with quarterly data may impose too high a hurdle to find an effect. 
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complementarity or substitution in mimicking different types of payouts.5 More broadly, our 
paper is also related to prior research on how a firm’s actions or outcomes affect its industry 
peers (see, e.g., Foster (1981) and Baginsky (1987) for earnings; Firth (1996), Howe and Shen 
(1998) and Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) for dividends; Eckbo (1983) for mergers; Lang and 
Stulz (1992) for bankruptcies; and Servaes and Tamayo (2014) for control threats). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses identification 
challenges and introduces our instrumental variables (IV). Section 3 lays out our empirical 
methodology and explains the construction, relevance, and validity of our instruments. Section 4 
presents firm-level summary statistics. Section 5 presents the main empirical tests, including IV 
regressions. Section 6 discusses potential motives for peer influence on payout by using a 
theoretical framework. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Identification challenges and instrumental variables 
The idea of peer effects on payouts is intuitive and grounded in theory. However, 
empirical tests of peer effects are challenging because of the ‘reflection problem’ highlighted by 
Manski (1993). Specifically, a positive correlation between a firm’s payout policy and the 
policies of its industry peers does not confirm that peer effects exist because firms may adopt 
similar dividend policies simultaneously in response to common industry shocks. For example, 
changes in investment opportunities or tax incentives may lead all firms within an industry to 
change their dividend policies simultaneously.6 
The ‘gold standard’ for overcoming such an identification problem requires randomly 
assigning peers to each candidate firm. Unfortunately, this approach is not feasible with 
observational data in which firms’ peers are fixed. An alternative solution entails the following: 
1) identify shocks that affect some firms in the peer group but not others, and 2) test how the 
                                                            
5 Moreover, Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007) find a stronger peer effect among 
concentrated industries using HHI based on sales. We use a newer and arguably better measure 
of product market competition, and find that both dividend and repurchase mimicking are more 
prevalent in more competitive industries. 
 
6 Many studies in social sciences have recognized a positive correlation among peer behavior but 
have warned against making causal inferences about peer effects (see Angrist, 2014). 
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affected firms’ responses to these shocks change the behavior of their peers that are unaffected 
by these shocks. This strategy lies at the heart of our empirical technique. 
To test how a firm, say firm i, is affected by payout policies of its peers, an ideal 
approach would be to collect ‘events’ that are relevant only for i's peer firms’ policies, but are 
random with respect to firm i's own policies. However, most such events are not readily 
observable to a researcher, and, more importantly, it is extremely difficult to ascertain that these 
events do not directly affect firm i.7 Fortunately, firms’ stock price changes, which impound the 
information about these events, are readily observable. These changes can be decomposed into 
systematic (i.e., common) components and firm-specific shocks by using asset-pricing models 
such as Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factor models. We follow Leary and Roberts 
(2014), who adopt this strategy in constructing their instrumental variables to study peer effects 
on capital structure. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we define peer firms as all other firms 
in the same three-digit SIC industry code in a given year. We identify shocks to peers’ payout 
policies via their stock return shocks (idiosyncratic returns) and idiosyncratic volatilities, which 
we use in instrumental variables models. Section 3.2 offers an extensive discussion of why these 
instrumental variables are relevant for peers’ dividend and repurchase policies. For now, we note 
that the empirical strategy here is to exploit heterogeneity in peer firms’ payout policies caused 
by idiosyncratic equity shocks they experience. Accordingly, in the first stage of our 
instrumental variables regressions, we predict peer firms’ dividend and repurchase policies with 
the peer firms’ average stock price shocks and the variance of these shocks. In the second stage, 
we use the peers’ predicted (instrumented) payout policies to explain firm-specific payout 
policies.  
3. Empirical methodology 
To estimate peer effects on dividends, we employ the following empirical model, which 
is similar to one used by Leary and Roberts (2014):  
                                                            
7 Leary and Roberts (2014) highlight this problem with the help of an example of CEO death. An 
accidental death of a CEO of a firm j appears to be a random event for any other firm k (≠ j). But 
this event can impact firm k directly via shifts in CEO labor markets and unanticipated changes 
in product markets.  
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ݕ௝௜௧ ൌ	∝ 	൅	ߚݕതି௜௝௧ ൅	ߛᇱ തܺି௜௝௧ ൅ ߣᇱ ௜ܺ௝௧ ൅ ߮′ݒ௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝௧  (1) 
The indices i, j and t correspond to firm, industry, and year respectively. The outcome 
variable ݕ௝௜௧ is a measure of the payout policies of firm i in industry j and year t. Peer firms are 
defined as all firms in the same three-digit SIC code, except firm i, in a given year. The variable 
ݕതି௜௝௧ denotes peer firms’ average dividend or repurchase policy (average of all firms in industry j 
except firm i in year t). We assume that ݕതି௜௝௧ is endogenous, which calls for using instrumental 
variables. Following Leary and Roberts, we use a contemporaneous ݕതି௜௝௧	measure instead of a 
lagged measure because peer effects are likely identified more cleanly if there is insufficient time 
lag for other variables to have an influence. The vectors തܺି௜௝௧	and ௜ܺ௝௧ contain peer firm averages 
and firm-specific characteristics, respectively,  as control variables; ݒ௧ represents year fixed 
effects; and ߝ௜௝௧ is the firm-specific error term that is assumed to be correlated within the firm 
and heteroskedastic. Therefore, all our regression specifications have heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors clustered within firms (Peterson (2009)). 
3.1 Construction of the instruments 
To parse out the firm-specific stock price shock, we follow Leary and Roberts (2014) but 
also augment our model with size, book-to-market and momentum factors (Fama-French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997)) as follows: 
௝ܴ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ெ 	ൈ ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ 	ൈ ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ுெ௅ 	ൈ ܪܯܮ௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ெைெ 	ൈ ܯܱܯ௧
൅ ߚ௜௝௧ூே஽ሺ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧ሻ ൅	ߟ௜௝௧	,																																																																															ሺ2ሻ	 
where ௝ܴ௜௧ refers to the total stock return for firm i in industry j over the month t. ܯܭ ௧ܶ is the 
excess market return, ܵܯܤ௧ is size factor, ܪܯܮ௧ is the book-to-market factor, ܯܱܯ௧ is the 
momentum factor, and ሺ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧ሻ	is the excess return on an equally weighted industry (three-
digit SIC code) portfolio, excluding firm i's return.	We include the last factor in the model to 
remove any common variation in stock returns across the industry.  
We estimate equation (2) for each firm on a rolling annual basis using historical monthly 
returns. We require at least 24 months of historical data and use up to 60 months of data in the 
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estimation. Most of the estimates use 60 months of data. As an example, in order to obtain 
expected and idiosyncratic returns for COKE from January 2000 to December 2000, we first 
estimate equation (2) using monthly returns from January 1995 to December 1999. Then using 
the estimated coefficients from equation (2) and monthly factor returns from January 2000 to 
December 2000, we use equation (3) to compute the expected and idiosyncratic returns as 
follows: 
ܧݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜௝௧ 	≡ 	 ෠ܴ௝௜௧
ൌ	∝ෝ௜௝௧൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ெ ൈ ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ ൈ ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ுெ௅ ൈ ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ெைெ ൈܯܱܯ௧ 	
൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ூே஽ሺ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧ሻ																																																																																																								ሺ3ሻ 
ܫ݀݅݋ݏݕ݊ܿݎܽݐ݅ܿ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝௜௧ ≡ 	 ̂ߟ௜௝௧ ൌ ௝ܴ௜௧ െ ෠ܴ௝௜௧	 
Here the letters with hats indicate estimated parameters. To obtain the expected and 
idiosyncratic risk of 2001, we repeat the same process by updating the estimation sample from 
January 1996 to December 2000 and use the estimated betas for 2001 returns. This process 
generates new beta estimates each calendar year.  
Understanding the importance and relevance of this instrument is crucial for accepting 
the inferences made in this study. The return shock, ̂ߟ௜௝௧, obtained from the above model is the 
return of the firm after removing all known sources of systematic variation (i.e., exposure to 
market, size factor, book-to-market factor, and momentum factor). To the extent that the Fama-
French and Carhart factor models explain the cross-section of stock returns, the residuals 
obtained from this model for any firm i should be purely firm-specific and uncorrelated with 
those of any other firm k (≠ i). Our model goes even further and augments the four-factor model 
with industry average excess return ሺ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧ሻ to remove any remaining correlation among 
the firms in the industry.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the estimated factor regressions. The average 
(median) number of months per rolling regression over the year is 54 (60). The majority of the 
regressions have a full five-year (60 month) window. The R-squared seems reasonable with a 
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mean of .307 and a median of .288.  The factor regressions load positively on market, size, and 
book-to-market factors and negatively on the momentum factor. Industry beta has the smallest 
load in absolute terms, which suggests that the four factors are successful in removing most of 
the systematic variation in the stock returns. The average idiosyncratic return is roughly 10 basis 
points.8 
For each firm i, we calculate the annual return shock by taking the geometric average of 
the monthly idiosyncratic returns obtained this way. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation 
of monthly return shocks for the year. Finally, we obtain averages of the annual return shocks 
and idiosyncratic risks for firm i’s peers by averaging these variables across all firms in the same 
three-digit SIC industry, excluding firm i, in a given year. We use these peer average equity 
shocks and risks as instrumental variables for predicting peers’ dividend and repurchase policies. 
3.2 Relevance and validity of the instruments for peers’ dividend and repurchase policies 
The conclusions in this paper largely depend on the quality of our two instrumental 
variables, peers’ average stock return shocks and peers’ idiosyncratic risk. To be valid, an 
instrument needs to satisfy two conditions: 1) relevance criterion, i.e., it should be strongly 
correlated with the endogenous regressor, which is peers’ dividend and repurchase policies in 
this study, and 2) exclusion restriction, i.e., the instrument should not have a direct effect on the 
dependent variable, which are firm-specific dividend and repurchase policies in this study. 
We first discuss the relevance criterion, i.e., why these instruments predict peers’ 
dividends and repurchase decisions. With regards to dividends, we find that peers’ equity return 
shock and idiosyncratic risk both strongly predict peers’ dividend decisions plausibly because 
these variables contain information about peers’ future performance relevant for cash dividends.9 
Specifically, these instruments are strong predictors of peers’ future profitability and cash flow 
volatility, both of which are among the most important determinants of dividends identified by 
                                                            
8 By construction, the average idiosyncratic return should be zero. It is non-zero due to loss of 
observations in the data cleaning process. 
 
9 Leary and Roberts (2014) use only peers’ average return shock as the instrument for financial 
leverage. 
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previous studies. For example, Fama and French (2001) find that the likelihood of paying 
dividends increases with profitability. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) find that firms 
tend to increase dividends during periods of earnings growth. Benito and Young (2003), Ferris, 
Sen, and Yui (2006), and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) present similar evidence for UK 
firms, and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) find similar results among European Union firms. 
Denis and Osobov (2008) present worldwide evidence that dividends are concentrated among the 
largest and most profitable firms. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find that firms that 
increase dividends in year t have experienced significant earnings increases in years t-1 and t, 
and firms that cut dividends in year t have experienced a reduction in earnings in years t and t-1. 
On the other hand, cash flow volatility predicts dividends payouts negatively (see, e.g., Bradley, 
Capozza and Seguin (1998), and Minton and Schrand (1999)) because cash flow uncertainty 
makes external financing costly. Moreover, the penalty for having to reduce dividends because 
of cash flow uncertainty also is severe.  
Next, we present an analysis that demonstrates how our instruments are related to the 
variables that are important determinants of dividends. Table 2 presents the results of regressions 
of peers’ average future profitability and cash flow volatility on peers’ average idiosyncratic 
equity shock (Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and equity risk (Peer Idios. Equity Risk) using firm-fixed 
effects. Column 1 shows that peers’ equity shock [risk] positively [negatively] predicts their 
future profitability (Peer Profitabilityt+1) in a highly significant manner, even after controlling 
for a host of other variables related to future profitability, including current profitability. This 
finding implies that these two instruments contain information about the market’s expectations of 
peers’ future profitability above and beyond the information contained in their current 
profitability and other characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 show that these instruments also predict 
peers’ profitability up to three years in the future. Finally, in column 4, the dependent variable is 
peers’ average future cash flow volatility (Peer Cash Flow Risk(t+1, t+5)), calculated as the average 
standard deviation of cash flows over the next five years. This test uses non-overlapping data 
using five-year intervals during the sample period. As expected, Peer Idios. Equity Risk (Peer 
Idios. Equity Shock) predicts peers’ future cash flow volatility positively (negatively) and in a 
highly significant manner. These results suggest that Peer Idios. Equity Shock and Peer Idios. 
Equity Risk contain information about the market’s expectation about peers’ future profitability 
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and cash flow risk, which are important determinants of dividends. This analysis offers a strong 
rationale for the relevance of these two variables as instruments for peers’ dividend policies. 
We expect our instruments to predict peers’ repurchase policies somewhat differently. 
Unlike dividends, repurchases are not viewed as a permanent commitment by a firm, so 
repurchases are not as strongly dependent on the level of future profitability as dividends are. 
Rather, due to market timing incentives, firms are more likely to repurchase their stock to exploit 
potential undervaluation (see, e.g., Dittmar and Field (2015)). Therefore, if positive idiosyncratic 
stock returns also reflect potential undervaluation and hence lack of market timing opportunities, 
our first instrument (Peer Idios. Equity Shock) should predict peers’ repurchases negatively. 
Consistently, Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find direct evidence that repurchases 
are followed by poorer market performance whereas dividend increases are followed by good 
performance. On the other hand, repurchases do involve large cash outflows. So, just like 
dividend decisions, repurchase decisions likely depend on a firm’s ability to maintain stable cash 
flows in the future. Therefore, firms which expect to have riskier cash flows are less likely to 
repurchase stocks and save cash for tapping into potential investment opportunities. Hence, we 
expect that peers’ idiosyncratic risk, which we have found to represent peers’ future cash flow 
risk in Table 2, should negatively predict peers’ repurchases. Our instrumental variables analysis 
later on obtains results consistent with these predictions. 
Next, we briefly discuss the exclusion restriction on the instruments. For this study, 
exclusion restriction requires that our two instruments, peer firms’ stock returns and risk shocks, 
should affect firm-specific dividend policies only via their effect on peers’ dividend policies. 
Leary and Roberts (2014) make a convincing case for the exclusion restriction. The idiosyncratic 
part of stock returns and risks are obtained as the residuals from a Fama-French and Carhart 
model. This model is well-regarded in the asset-pricing literature for its ability to decompose 
stock returns into those due to common factors and due to firm-specific shocks. Moreover, we 
include excess industry return as an additional factor in the model to help remove any industry-
specific commonalties in stock returns. Therefore, the residuals obtained from this model are 
plausibly purely firm-specific. Leary and Roberts (2014) show that these shocks have some 
desirable statistical properties that support their exogeneity: these shocks are serially 
uncorrelated and serially cross-uncorrelated, which means that firms’ shocks do not forecast 
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future shocks for themselves or for their peers. Moreover, as shown later, our instruments pass 
the tests of over-identification (e.g., Hansen’s J), which further supports the validity of our 
instruments.  
4. Data and summary statistics 
The primary data on public firms’ financials and stock prices come from the CRSP-
COMPUSTAT merged database. The full sample runs from 1965 to 2010. Following previous 
studies (e.g., Leary and Roberts (2014)), we exclude financial (6000=<SIC code=<6999), 
utilities (4900=<SIC code =<4999) and government entities (SIC code>9000) because these 
industries are highly regulated. For some additional tests, we obtain product market fluidity data 
from Hoberg and Phillips’s data library, probability of informed trading (PIN) data from 
Professor Stephen Brown’s website, and analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S. The main variables 
used in this study are described in the Appendix.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of our final sample of about 98,270 firm-year 
observations. The final sample consists of about 9,180 unique firms over our 46-year sample 
period. There are about 240 industries identified by three-digit SIC codes in our sample. The 
typical industry has a median of 14 firms and a mean of 32 firms. To mitigate the influence of 
outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. The table provides 
summary statistics for firm-specific variables and peer average variables separately. About 47% 
the firm-years pay cash dividends, and 35% of firms repurchase shares. Each year, about 3.5% of 
last year’s non-payers start paying dividends. The amount of dividend (share repurchase) 
represents about 1% (1.2%) of assets, on average, which makes the mean total payout (the sum 
of the former two) about 2.2% of total assets. The average annual equity return shock is -4%, 
which is different from 0 mainly because the return shocks are annualized by compounding the 
monthly shocks.10 The standard deviation idiosyncratic monthly return is 13.2%. The 
distributions of other variables are similar to those in the previous literature. Not surprisingly, 
                                                            
10 Note that while the sum of the 12 monthly idiosyncratic returns should be zero, the 
compounded return need not be zero. 
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peer firm averages for all the variables are similar to individual firm averages, but the standard 
deviations of peer firm averages are consistently lower than those of individual firms.  
5. Peer effects on payout policies 
In this section, we present and discuss the results obtained from our regression analysis. 
We begin with some baseline models. Then we proceed to our instrumental variables techniques 
to examine if peers have a causal influence on a firm’s payout decisions. 
5.1 Decision to pay dividends or to repurchase 
Table 4 presents the results from a battery of regression analyses of whether a firm’s 
decisions to initiate and pay dividends or to repurchase shares are influenced by the 
corresponding decisions of its peers. We start with an analysis of the decision to pay a dividend, 
and then focus on the dividend initiation decision.11 The main dependent variable for columns 1 
and 2 is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm pays cash dividend in a given fiscal year 
(Dividend Payer). From columns 3 to 5, the dependent variable is whether a firm starts paying 
dividends (Dividend Initiation). The main explanatory variable of interest in columns 1 through 5 
is the fraction of peer firms who are dividend payers (Peer Div. Payers). We use different 
variations of the instrumental variable Probit (IV-Probit) regressions to estimate a potential 
causal effect of peers on the dividend payment decision. The control variables include a number 
of firm characteristics identified in the literature as important predictors of dividend decisions. 
For example, we control for future growth opportunities by including size, market-to-book ratio, 
sales growth, and R&D expenses (see, e.g., Grullon and Michaely (2002), Fama and French 
(2002) and Grullon, Paye, Underwood, and Weston (2009)). Likewise, we include the ratio of 
retained earnings to book equity (RE/BE) to control for the life cycle stage of the firm 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006)). Similarly, we include the firm’s current profitability 
and cash flow volatility to control for cash flow risk.  
                                                            
11 While most firms do not stop paying dividends once they start, some do. In our sample, about 
4 percent of dividend payers omitted dividends at some point and 3.5 percent of non-payers 
initiated dividends.  This analysis captures the firms’ choice each year between retaining cash 
and distributing dividends in such cases.  
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The dependent variable, Dividend Payer, is a binary variable, so we estimate an 
instrumental variable probit (IV-Probit) model. Column 1 shows results from the first stage of an 
IV-Probit model, in which the dependent variable is Peer Div. Payers and the instruments are 
lagged peers’ idiosyncratic return shocks (Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock)) and lagged peers’ 
idiosyncratic risk (Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk)). As expected, the results reveal that the former 
(latter) variable predicts peers’ dividends significantly positively (negatively), even after 
controlling for a number of other important determinants of dividends. Column 2 shows the 
second-stage of the IV-Probit model, in which the fitted value of Peer Div. Payers from the first 
stage (Instrumented Peer Div. Payers) predicts the firm-specific dividend decision. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, Instrumented Peer Div. Payers obtains a positive and statistically highly 
significant coefficient in explaining a firm’s decision to pay dividends. The estimated marginal 
effect of Peer Div. Payers on the probability of a firm paying dividends, when other variables are 
kept at their means, is 0.26 (p<0.01). This estimate suggests that compared to a firm with no 
dividend paying peers, a firm with all dividend paying peers is 26% more likely to pay 
dividends. Clearly, this is an economically significant relation. Moreover, both instruments are 
individually and jointly significant at 1% levels. So our instruments are relevant in explaining the 
fraction of peer firms which pay cash dividends each year. These results enable us to conclude 
that peers’ policies about whether to pay dividends influence a firm’s own such a decision.  
Dividend policies are sticky, which raises the question whether these results are simply 
an artifact of persistent dividends, or whether peers actually influence the dynamics of a firm’s 
dividend payments. To address this issue, we next examine the effect of peers’ dividend-paying 
decisions on a firm’s decision to start paying dividends (Dividend Initiation). This analysis is 
conducted on the sample of firms which did not pay dividends in the previous year. As shown in 
column 3 of Table 4, the second stage IV-Probit model obtains a positive coefficient on 
Instrumented Peer Div. Payers, which is statistically significant at the 5% level in predicting 
firm-specific Dividend Initiation. 12 The result implies that firms are more likely to initiate 
dividends if more of their peers pay dividends. The estimated marginal effect of Peer Div. 
Payers on the probability of Dividend Initiation, when other variables are kept at their means, is 
0.012 (p<0.10). This suggests that compared to a firm with no dividend paying peers, a firm with 
                                                            
12 The first stage results are similar to those in column 1, so they are not reported to save space. 
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all dividend paying peers is 1.2% more likely to initiate dividends. This impact is economically 
quite significant considering that the unconditional rate of dividend initiation is merely 3.5%. 
Since firms can distribute cash back to investors either by dividends or share repurchases, 
an important question is whether peer influence on dividend initiation is equally important for 
firms which repurchase shares as a way of paying back the stockholders. To answer this 
question, we re-estimate the instrumental variable regressions of dividend initiation separately 
among the sample of non-repurchasers (column 4) and repurchasers (column 5) based on 
whether they bought back any stock last year. Clearly, peer influence on initiating dividends is 
concentrated among firms which do not repurchase shares. This is an important finding because 
dividend initiations are perhaps one of the most important decisions in a firm’s life-cycle. Our 
finding that some firms can deflect peer pressure to initiate dividends suggests that studies that 
focus on dividend paying firms only (e.g., Popadak (2017)) may overestimate the importance of 
peer effects on firms’ dividend policies. 
Next we analyze whether firms are also influenced by their peers’ decision to repurchase 
shares, and whether such influence is equally important for dividend payers and nonpayers. 
Analysis of repurchase decisions, which are similar to those of the dividend paying decisions, are 
presented in columns 6 through 9. Column 6 is the first stage of the IV-Probit regression, in 
which the dependent variable is the fraction of peers which repurchase shares in a given year 
(Peer Repurchasers) and the instrumental variables are peers’ average idiosyncratic returns and 
risks (Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk)). As we hypothesized in 
section 3.2, both of our instruments predict Peer Repurchasers negatively and significantly so 
these instruments are strong predictors of peers’ decisions to repurchase stocks. Column 7, the 
second stage of IV-Probit regression, shows that the instrumented Peer Repurchasers predicts a 
firm’s decision to repurchase shares (Repurchaser) positively and statistically significantly. 
Estimated marginal effect of Peer Repurchasers, evaluated when other variables are kept at their 
means, is 0.16 (p<.010). In terms of economic significance, this result suggests that a firm with 
all peers repurchasing is 16% is more likely to repurchase shares itself, compared to a firm with 
no peers that repurchase. 
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Our next two tests are aimed at analyzing whether there is heterogeneity in peer influence 
in payout policy based on whether or not a firm also pays dividends. Unlike in the dividend 
initiation decision, we find that peer influence in share repurchases is more pronounced among 
firms which also pay dividends as shown in columns 8 and 9. This result may be because firms 
tend to repurchase shares out of temporary, non-operating cash flows, while they pay dividends 
out of permanent, ongoing cash flows (see Jagannathan et. al. (2000)). The cash flows of non-
dividend payers are more likely to be temporary. So, for distributing them via repurchases, peer 
effects in repurchases may be of second order importance compared to the desire to dodge 
initiating dividends. On the other hand, for firms with permanent cash flows (i.e., dividend 
payers), the decision to do repurchases is more susceptible to peer influence. 
Overall, this analysis shows that a firm’s decision on whether to pay dividends or to 
repurchase shares is significantly influenced by the corresponding policies of its peers. Only 
those firms which do not repurchase shares are likely to follow peers and initiate dividends. 
However, dividend paying firms are more likely to mimic peers’ share repurchase decisions. 
5.2 Amount of payout 
Our analysis so far finds a strong and plausibly causal effect of peers on a firm’s decision 
on whether to start paying dividends and to repurchase shares. In this section, we analyze 
whether peers also influence firms’ decisions about the amount of dividends and repurchase. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms benchmark the amount of dividends they pay to the 
levels of their peers’ dividends.13 An analysis of peer influence on the amount of dividend payout 
is especially interesting because practitioners, as well as academics, use dividend payout ratios as 
an important metric for comparative valuations (e.g., Graham and Kumar (2006)).  
We employ a variety of models and variables to analyze different methods of payouts. 
We obtain our main dividend payout variable by scaling annual cash dividends by total assets 
                                                            
13 “We believe that a best-in-class dividend policy should be based on the five CLIMB 
dimensions: capital planning, long-term sustainability, investor preferences, materiality and 
benchmarking to peers.” - J.P Morgan (2011), Dividends: the 2011 Guide to Dividend Policy 
Trends and Best Practices. 
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(Div/Assets). Following Allen and Michaely (2003) and Li and Zhao (2008), we normalize the 
amount of dividends by book assets, rather than by market capitalization or earnings, to ensure 
that the results are not influenced by stock price variations or affected by firms with negative 
earnings.14 To parallel dividend payout measure, we calculate repurchase payout as the amount 
of repurchases scaled by total assets (Repur/Assets). 
Because some firms pay dividends and/or repurchase shares and others do not, all of our 
payout variables are censored at zero. This feature of the data makes OLS models biased and 
calls for using Tobit-based regressions, which jointly model the propensity of paying dividends 
or repurchasing shares, and the amount of such payouts. For robustness, we also employ linear 
models using the subsample of firms with non-zero dividends or repurchases. Table 5 presents 
regression results regarding dividend payouts. The analysis summarized in panel A includes the 
full sample of both dividend payers, nonpayers, repurchasers and non-repurchaers. As before, we 
employ instrumental variable techniques to examine if there is any causal effect of peers’ payout 
policies on firm-specific policies. As in section 5.1, the two instrumental variables for Peer 
Div/Assets and Peer Repur/Assets are Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. 
Equity Risk). Column 1 of panel A shows the estimates from the first stage of an instrumental 
variable Tobit (IV-Tobit) model for dividend payouts. As expected, this first-stage regression 
obtains a positive [negative] and highly significant coefficient on peers’ average return shocks 
[risks] in predicting Peer Div/Assets. Next, the second stage estimate (column 2) obtains a 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.58 on Instrumented Peer Div/Assets in explaining a 
firm’s dividend payout. These results convey that peer firms’ payout ratios have a positive causal 
effect on firm-specific dividend payout ratios. Specifically, the coefficient estimate of 0.58 
suggests that an increase in Peer Div/Assets ratio by 10% leads a firm to increase its own 
Div/Assets ratio by about 5.8%. Clearly, in addition to being statistically significant, this effect is 
also economically substantial.  
                                                            
14 It seems especially important to avoid stock price as the scaling factor in this study because 
our instrumental variables are based on stock returns. For robustness, in unreported tests we also 
use other measures such as cash dividends scaled by either total revenue (Div/Sales) or cash 
flows (Div/CashFlow). Div/CashFlow is similar to the dividend payout ratio variable popular in 
finance textbooks, except that the scaling variable is cash flows instead of accounting profits. We 
exclude observations where Div/CashFlow is negative because of negative cash flows. 
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We next estimate IV-Tobit regressions using repurchase to assets ratio (Repur/Assets) as 
an alternative measure of payout. As expected, the first stage of IV-Tobit regression reported in 
column (3) obtains negative and significant coefficients on both of our instruments in predicting 
peers’ average repurchase ratio (Peer Repur/Assets). In column (4), the second stage regression 
obtains a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 1.659 on Instrumented Peer 
Repur/Assets ratio in predicting a firm’s own repurchase ratio. Specifically, the coefficient 
estimate suggests that an increase in Peer Repur/Assets ratio by 10% leads a firm to increase its 
own Div/Assets ratio by about 16.6%. Finally, we analyze peer influence on total payout, 
calculated as the sum of dividends and repurchases scaled by total assets (Total Payout).  As 
shown in column 5 (second stage of IV-Tobit), consistent with the separate analysis of each 
payout variable, the Instrumented Peer Total Payout ratio positively predicts the firm-specific 
Total Payout ratio in a highly significant manner.  
It appears that firms mimic their peers’ payouts in the form of both dividends and 
repurchases. However, as we will see later, our cross-sectional tests find some significant 
differences in firms’ mimicking behavior on dividends and repurchases based on firm 
characteristics and market conditions. Therefore, we continue to analyze these decisions 
separately in subsequent sections. 
Next, we estimate the instrumental variable regressions of both type of payouts within the 
subsample of firms with positive cash dividends or repurchases. These tests examine if the 
evidence of peer effects on payout ratios survives among payers only, and is not an artifact of a 
discrete jump from zero to a positive payout. Because these samples now do not have a point 
mass of 0 in the distribution of dividend payouts, we use linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
models for the instrumental variable analysis. Table 5, panel B presents the second stages of the 
2SLS regressions for our two payout variables. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained from the full sample using IV-Tobit models, but the point estimate of the peers’ 
repurchase ratio is smaller than in Panel A.  
Model diagnostics also obtain desirable results. In all cases, different variations of weak 
instrument tests obtain significant test statistics, which convey that our instruments are strong 
predictors of peers’ payout variables. Furthermore, in the analysis in panel B, which uses linear 
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2SLS in which over-identification tests are feasible, the Hansen’s J statistic is insignificant in 
both models. So these instruments appear to satisfy the exclusion restriction and appear to be 
valid for the analysis of both dividends and repurchases. Overall, these features of our analysis 
strongly suggest that peer firms’ payout ratios have a causal effect on a firm’s own payout ratios. 
Next we analyze if peer influence on the amount of payout is different for firms that use 
and do not use the alternative payout method. In other words, we ask whether peer influence on 
the amount of dividends (repurchases) is larger or smaller among firms which also repurchase 
shares (pay dividends). Earlier, we have found that peer influence on dividend initiation is 
nonexistent for firms which repurchase shares. However, we do not necessarily expect such 
heterogeneity in the amount of dividends once a firm decides to pay dividends. Initiating 
dividends is a much more significant decision than the amount of dividends. As shown in panel 
C, columns 1 and 2, peer influence on the amount of dividends is roughly similar for share 
repurchasers and non-repurchasers. Columns 3 and 4 show that peer influence on the amount of 
repurchases is somewhat stronger for dividend paying firms. The analysis of both the decision to 
repurchase in Table 4 and the amount of repurchases in Table 5, panel C suggests that mimicking 
repurchases is somewhat more prevalent among dividend payers. Therefore, it is likely that some 
dividend payers also do occasional repurchases, influencing their peers to follow suit. 
We next present some robustness checks of our main findings. One concern is that the 
observed relation between a firm’s payout and its peers’ payout may be due to all firms in an 
industry responding to time-varying dividend premiums. When the dividend premium is high, all 
firms pay more dividends, and vice versa. This possibility should be largely controlled for by our 
instrumental variables analysis because IVs plausibly contain purely firm-specific news so they 
should be uncorrelated with any market- or industry-wide factors (recall that our model for 
computing the idiosyncratic stock return shock controls for peer average return). Moreover, we 
include year fixed effects that largely control for any time-varying dividend premium.  
Nevertheless, a lingering concern is that the dividend premium may vary across 
industries, which we not have accounted for adequately.  We deal with this issue in several other 
ways. First, we calculate the value-weighted dividend premium every year following the 
approach used by Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Lie (2006)). Based on the time-series 
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median of the annual dividend premiums, we split our sample by high and low dividend 
premium years, and re-estimate our regressions separately in the two subsamples. As presented 
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, panel D, we find that peer influence on dividend exists during 
both high and low dividend premium years but it is stronger during low dividend premium 
years.15 This result may reflect the possibility that during years of high dividend premiums, firms 
have an incentive to pay higher dividends to cater to investor preferences, so they are less 
affected by what peers do. That is, in high dividend premium years, investors’ preference for 
dividends dominates peer effects. On the other hand, dividend payment becomes more 
discretionary during low dividend premium years, which makes firms more susceptible to peer 
effects.  Similarly, as shown in columns 5 and 6, peer influence on repurchases only exists 
significantly in the years with low dividend premiums. One interpretation of this finding is that 
during low dividend premium years, firms have more discretion not only over how much 
dividend to pay, but also over whether to pay dividends or repurchase shares, making them more 
prone to peer effects. Second, we control for potential industry variation in dividend premium by 
including year x industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects in the models.16 Columns 3 and 7 of 
Panel D show the second stage of 2SLS models, in which peer influence continues to remain 
positive and significant both for dividends and repurchases, respectively, even after controlling 
for these fixed effects. Finally, we employ firm-fixed effects models which can control for any 
time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity (including exposure to industry-level dividend 
premiums). Columns 4 and 8 show these results from the second stages of 2SLS, in which peer 
influence continues to be significant for the levels of both dividends and repurchases. These 
results collectively indicate that the observed peer effect is unlikely to be entirely driven by 
variation in aggregate dividend premiums.  
To summarize, we consider both dividend and repurchase amounts and employ a variety 
of estimation models to examine peer effects on payout policies. Collectively, the results 
                                                            
15 Consistent with the prior literature, we find that unconditionally, firms are more likely to pay 
dividends in high premium years than in low premium years (56% vs. 35%). 
16 Here we use the Fama and French (1993) 48-industry classification even though our peers are 
defined at the 3-digit SIC levels. We do this for two reasons. First, there are 240 unique SIC 
codes and 45 years in our sample. It is unlikely that dividend premium will vary at such a 
granular level of industry classification. Moreover, combining 3-digit SIC with years leads to 
more than 10,000 fixed effects and potentially over-parameterizes our models.  
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strongly suggest that a firm’s decisions about how much to pay in dividends and repurchases are 
significantly influenced by the decisions of its industry peers. While peer influence on dividends 
seems largely independent of aggregate dividend premiums, mimicking of repurchases is 
prevalent only in years with low dividend premiums. 
6. Reasons behind peer effects in payouts 
In this section, we attempt to identify the reasons why firms mimic their peers’ payout 
policies. Based on an extensive review of the literature on firms’ imitation behavior, Lieberman 
and Asaba (2006) propose two broad reasons why firms imitate each other: 1) rivalry-based 
theory 2) information-based theory. They also provide a roadmap for empirical tests that may 
distinguish between these two motives. In essence, their framework suggests that firms likely 
imitate peers to maintain competitive parity or to limit rivalry, as predicted by the rivalry-based 
theory, if all of the following three conditions are met:17 
A. Firms compete in same market or niche, and  
B. they are of similar size or resource, and  
C. information environment is not highly uncertain 
If any of the above conditions are not met, mimicking may be consistent with an 
information-based theory, which suggests that firms imitate their better-informed peers. For 
instance, younger firms may follow their older peers if they believe the latter are better informed 
about product markets and investors. In the next sections, we attempt to test the role of these 
three conditions on peer influence on dividends. 
6.1 Product market competition 
Regarding condition A, in a less competitive environment, product differentiation is 
relatively easier. So there is less need to imitate other firms’ payout decisions to signal a firm’s 
own quality to investors. For instance, despite sitting on a huge cash balance, Apple Inc. did not 
pay dividends for many years, while many of its competitors did. However, investors 
consistently placed high valuations on Apple mainly because of the perceived high quality and 
                                                            
17 See, Lieberman and Asaba (2006, p. 376, Fig. 1). 
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uniqueness of its products. On the other hand, increased competition with more players and more 
homogeneous products makes product differentiation difficult. This makes mimicking payouts 
more important for signaling quality and competing in the capital market.  
By construction, peers in our sample are firms that share the same three-digit SIC code, 
which is quite a narrow industry classification. So firms within each of these industries are likely 
to compete with each other in similar markets. But the degree of competition can vary across the 
industries. So we conduct one more empirical experiment to test the merit of condition A. First, 
from Hoberg and Phillips’s (2016) website, we obtain data on firms’ exposure to product market 
competition based on how similar a firm’s products are to those of its rivals. Hoberg and Phillips 
derive this measure, known as ‘total similarity’, based on how firms describe themselves in the 
product description section of their 10-K filings. The authors show that this classification does a 
better job of identifying high competition environments and rivals than the traditional industry 
classifications do. Moreover, this classification allows the set of a firm’s competitors to vary 
over time. We define a firm as facing more [less] intense competition in the product market if the 
‘total similarity’ score for its products is above [below] the median.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of our analysis on the subsamples of firms that 
operate in more and less competitive environments. Each column presents the results from the 
second stage regressions of an IV-Tobit model. For each payout variable, Div/Assets and 
Repur/Assets, the point estimate on the instrumented peer average is significantly larger among 
more competitive firms than among less competitive firms.18 This result favors condition A and 
suggests that peer effects on payouts are stronger among firms that compete more fiercely in the 




18 Ideally, we would also want to test if the coefficient estimates across the two subsamples are 
statistically different from each other, which would be a straightforward exercise for linear 
models. However, these results are from second stages of nonlinear IV Tobit models, in which 
reliable tests for such comparisons are not readily available. Therefore, we focus on the 
differences in economic magnitude. 
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6.2 Who mimics whom? Leaders and followers based on size, age and asset tangibility 
This section presents an analysis aimed at testing the merit of condition B. The rivalry-
based theory predicts that in order to maintain their competitive parity with peers, firms would 
mimic the payout policies of peers which are similar to them in size, age and ease of valuation. 
On the other hand, the information-based theory predicts that firms that are smaller, younger and 
harder-to-value would follow the policies of larger, older and easier-to-value firms, which are 
likely better-informed about product and capital markets. We examine which of these theories is 
supported by the data. We partition the sample into three terciles by firm size, based on market 
capitalization each year. We define smaller firms as the firms in the bottom tercile and larger 
firms as the firms in the top tercile of the size distribution. We then construct the peer average 
payout variables and the two instrumental variables separately within smaller or larger peers. In 
the same fashion, we define older, younger, less tangible and more tangible firms and construct 
the payout ratios and the instrumental variables for each peer group separately. 
In the first two columns of Table 6, panel B, we estimate the regressions of dividend 
payouts (Div/Assets) only among the subsample of smaller firms. We compute peer average 
dividend payout and the instrumental variables using the subsample of smaller (larger) peers in 
column 1 (2). The goal is to examine whether small firms mimic the dividend decisions of their 
smaller industry peers or larger ones. Similarly, in columns 3 and 4, we estimate the regressions 
only within the subsample of larger firms. Again, we calculate the peer payouts by averaging the 
payout ratios of the smaller (larger) peers in column 3 (4). The aim is to examine whether larger 
firms mimic the dividend decisions of their smaller or larger peers in the industry. We follow a 
similar approach to analyze younger firms in columns 5 and 6, older firms in columns 7 and 8, 
and less/more tangible firms in columns 9 through 12. Columns 13 to 24 repeats this analysis for 
Repur/Assets as the dependent variable. 
Each column in Table 6, panel B shows results of second-stage regressions from IV-Tobit 
models. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on small peer firms’ instrumented average payout 
ratio (Small Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets) is positive and much larger in magnitude than that 
on the large peers’ ratio (Large Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets) in predicting a smaller firm’s 
dividend payout. The implication is that smaller firms are more influenced by dividend decisions 
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of other smaller firms. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of large firms’ decisions to follow 
peers’ policies. We find that Small Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets has no significant effect on 
large firms’ payout, but Large Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets has a significant positive effect on 
large firms’ payouts. So it appears that larger firms are influenced by the dividend decisions of 
their larger peers only. The strongest peer effect (0.552) seems to run from smaller peers to 
smaller firms. Similarly, the results in columns 5 through 8 reveal that younger (older) firms are 
more strongly influenced by the dividend decisions of their younger (older) industry peers. The 
point estimate is the largest (0.409) for the younger peers’ effect on younger firms. Finally, 
columns 9 through 12 analyze leaders and followers in terms of ease of valuation, measured by 
their asset tangibility (PP&E/Assets ratio). We find that dividend policies of less tangible firms 
(PP&E/Assets ratio < Median) are influenced by both types of peers: more and less tangible. On 
the other hand, more tangible firms are influenced by the decisions of their more tangible peers 
only. 
Columns 13 through 24 present the results of corresponding analyses for the amount of 
repurchases. In general, peer influence in repurchase amounts exists mainly among larger, older 
and more tangible firms, which mimic the actions of their larger, older and more tangible 
industry peers. Unlike dividend payout decisions, smaller, younger and less tangible firms do not 
mimic the amount of repurchases of their peers.  
Overall, it appears that firms’ dividend decisions are mainly influenced by the industry 
peers in their own size and age cohorts. The magnitude of this influence seems to be the largest 
among smaller and younger firms. For repurchases too, peer influence generally seems to exist 
among their own cohorts. These findings support the rivalry-based theory, rather than the 
information-based theory, of peer influence in dividends. 
6.3 Information environment 
This section explores the merit of condition C. If dividend mimicking is motivated by 
information, rather than rivalry, this behavior should be more prevalent in environments with 
higher information uncertainty (Lieberman and Asaba (2006)). In this section, we examine if 
peer influence on dividends is more pronounced among firms with high information uncertainty. 
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We use two variables as measures for information uncertainty: 1) industry average analyst 
coverage, computed as the average monthly number of earnings forecasts a firm in the industry 
receives over the fiscal year, and 2) industry average of the probability of informed trading 
(PIN).19  We consider a firm to have a more [less] uncertain information environment if the 
firm’s industry average PIN is higher [lower] than the median industry average PIN or if the 
industry average number of analyst forecasts is below [above] the median. 
Panel C of Table 6 presents the results of regressions estimated on subsamples of firms 
with higher or lower information uncertainty. Using each measure, we find that the peer effect on 
dividend is more pronounced among firms that operate in better information environments, i.e., 
firms in industries that are followed by more analysts and where stock trading conveys less 
private information (lower PIN). We also find some evidence that peer effects in repurchases are 
higher in better information environments, i.e., firms in industries that are followed by more 
analysts. These findings do not suggest that peer influence in payouts is greater in more uncertain 
environments and do not support the information-based theory of imitation. 
Overall, these results do not provide strong support for traditional signaling theories of 
dividend. While smaller, younger and harder-to-value firms exhibit mimicking behavior, which 
is consistent with a signaling motive, larger, more established and easier-to-value firms do it too. 
Moreover, we find no evidence that mimicking is more pronounced in the presence of higher 
information uncertainty. This result contradicts the prediction of signaling theory that mimicking 
should be more prevalent among firms for which the benefit of signaling should be larger due to 
greater information asymmetry.20 
                                                            
19 Analysts are among the most important information producers in financial markets. A number 
of prior studies show that financial analyst research is an important channel through which 
information about a firm is revealed (see, e.g., Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Gleason 
and Lee (2003), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), and Adhikari (2016)). 
Thus, greater analyst following implies a better information environment. Similarly, a large 
literature finds that PIN measures information asymmetry between firms and investors. For 
example, a larger PIN reflects a poorer quality of financial disclosure (see, e.g., Brown and 
Hillegeist (2007)). We use industry average analyst coverage and PIN because testing rivalry-
based vs. information-based theories of mimicking requires a measure of the overall information 
environment within an industry. 
20 This finding parallels Leary and Michaely’s (2011) finding that dividend smoothing is more 
prevalent in firms with lower information asymmetry. 
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7. Additional analyses 
This section presents the results of three tests that shed additional light on the causes and 
consequences of peer influence in payouts. 
7.1 Role of financial constraints  
 We expect peer influence on dividends to depend on financial constraints. Constraints on 
dividend payouts imposed by financial troubles and difficulty in raising external capital to 
finance investments should dominate the incentive to imitate peers’ payout. This should 
especially be true with dividends, which conveys a stronger commitment by the firm to the 
market, than repurchases. We use a firm’s credit rating by S&P as a measure of its financial 
constraints following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015), whose findings suggest that not 
having a credit rating does a better job of identifying financial constraints compared to other 
traditional measures of financial constraints.21  
Panel D of Table 6 presents the results of regressions estimated on subsamples of firms 
with and without a long-term credit rating from S&P. We find that the peer effect on dividend is 
more pronounced among rated firms, which have better access to external capital. On the other 
hand, peer influence in repurchases is virtually indistinguishable among rated and unrated firms. 
The importance of financial constraint in dividend mimicking and its lack in repurchase 
mimicking are consistent with the findings of Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) that 




21 We stick to the absence of a credit rating as a measure of financial constraint for two reasons. 
First, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) find that the five popular traditional proxies of 
financial constraint (i.e., having a credit rating, paying dividends, and the indices of Kaplan-
Zingales, Whited-Wu, and Hadlock-Pierce) do not adequately predict a firm’s ability to raise 
external capital. Their empirical findings suggest that having or not having a credit rating does a 
somewhat better job of predicting financial constraint, even though it may proxy for the stage of 
a firm’s life cycle. Second, the last three indices are linear combinations of a firm’s age, size and 
leverage, some of which we have already used to partition the sample for size and age leaders 
and followers. 
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7.2 Trends in peer influence 
We first examine how peer influence on dividends and repurchases has changed over 
time. This analysis extends the analyses by Fama and French (2001a), who find that the 
propensity to pay dividends has decreased over time and bottomed-out in the 1990s; DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), who find that the overall amount of dividends has actually 
increased, but has become concentrated among larger and profitable firms; and Julio and 
Ikenberry (2004), who argue that dividend initiations and increases have picked up in the early 
2000s. We explore whether the trends in peer influence in payouts are consistent with the 
intertemporal patterns in aggregate dividend payouts and repurchases found by previous studies. 
We estimate our main regressions in subsamples of roughly a decade each: 1965 to 1979 
(1970s), 1980 to 1989 (1980s), 1990 to 1999 (1990s), and 2000 to 2010 (2000s). The results of 
payout using IV-Tobit regressions are presented in Table 7. In Panel A, we find an interesting 
pattern: the magnitude of peer influence on dividends payout continues to increase until it peaks 
in the 1990s and declines in the 2000s.  Intriguingly, this pattern mirrors Grullon et. al.’s (2011) 
finding that the proportion of dividend-paying firms bottomed out in the 1990s, then increased 
slightly in the 2000s.  
Panel B reports results of similar analyses of repurchases. Interestingly, the trend in peer 
influence in share repurchases mirrors the trend in peer influence in dividends. Collectively, this 
set of results is consistent with the studies of Skinner (2008) and Grullon and Michaely (2002), 
who show a significant substitution from dividends to share repurchases. 
7.3 Market reaction to dividend changes conditioned on proximity to peers 
To dig deeper into firms’ incentives to follow peers’ dividends, we next examine 
dividend announcement returns as a function of peers’ dividends. Specifically, we examine how 
the market reacts to dividend change announcements by a firm, conditional on where the level of 
its resulting dividend stacks up relative to its industry peers. To do so, we first calculate the 
absolute difference between a firm’s dividend payout ratios and those of their peers’. Then based 
on the median of such absolute differences, we partition the sample by whether a firm’s dividend 
payout ratios are close to or far from its peers.  
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Table 8 presents the regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns CAR (-1,+1) 
around quarterly dividend announcements as a function of changes in firm-level dividend 
payouts (Div/Assets) and whether the payout ratios are close to (Panel A: models 1, 3 and 5) or 
far from (Panel A: models 2, 4 and 6) industry peers’. In Panel A, columns 1 and 2 show, as 
expected, that the change in the dividend to assets ratio (∆Div/Assets) positively predicts the 
market reaction to the change. The marginal effect of this change is slightly larger when the 
resulting dividend is closer to peer averages (column 1) than when it is further away from them 
(column 2), though the difference is statistically insignificant, as shown by the chi-squared test in 
the last row of the panel.  
These patterns become more interesting when we partition the samples further by 
whether there was an increase (columns 3 and 4) or decrease (columns 4 and 5) in the firm-level 
quarterly payout ratio. Columns 3 and 4 show that when a firm increases its dividend payout 
ratio, the marginal effect of the change in the payout ratio on the market reaction is much higher 
if the resulting dividend is closer to peers than when it is further away from them. The coefficient 
on ∆Div/Assets in columns 3 and 4 is 1.645 and 0.674, respectively, and the difference between 
them is statistically significant at the 1% level. A potential explanation of this difference is that 
the market considers an increase in dividends to be more sustainable when the resulting payout 
ratio is closer to its peers’ and reacts more positively. In the subsample of firm-quarters with 
decreases in Div/Assets, the marginal effect of ∆Div/Assets also positively predicts the market 
reaction to the change, i.e., larger decreases in dividends lead to larger drops in stock prices. But 
there is no statistical difference in the market reaction between subsamples where the resulting 
dividend payout ratio is closer to peers and where it is further away from peers. One possible 
reason for this asymmetry is that dividend increases are largely voluntary, so investors pay more 
attention to whether dividend payout is on par with peers. On the other hand, dividend decreases 
are more likely to be imposed by financial constraints, so being close to peers is less important. 
One issue with the analysis relates to time variation in the premium that investors place 
on dividends. Specifically, firms may increase dividends and try to catch up with industry peers’ 
dividend payouts during years with high dividend premiums. If so, our results in columns (3) and 
(4) of Panel A may be entirely driven by a more positive market reaction during higher dividend 
premium years, regardless of whether a firm mimics its peers or not. To address this issue, in 
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Panel B, we repeat this analysis of dividend increases in the subsamples of high and low 
dividend premium years, as defined in Panel D of Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)] are 
subsamples of high [low] dividend premium years and dividend increases. Consistent with Li 
and Lie (2006), the coefficient estimates of dividend change in columns (1) and (2) are higher 
than those in (3) and (4), respectively, which suggests that the market reaction to dividend 
increases is more positive in high dividend premium years. However, importantly, within high 
(low) dividend premium years, the coefficient on ∆Div/Assets is significantly larger when the 
resulting dividend payout is closer to peers than when it is farther away from peers [see columns 
(1) vs. (2) ((3) vs. (4))]. As shows by the Chi2-test, these differences in coefficients are also 
statistically significant. Therefore, it appears that the market views dividend increases more 
positively if the resulting dividend comes closer to peers, regardless of a general market-wide 
preference for dividends. 
7.4 Do peer effects increase over time following dividend initiation? 
Dividends tend to be sticky. Therefore, one interesting question is whether a firm starts 
following its peers right from the time it initiates a dividend or whether its dividend tends to 
gradually converge to its peers’. We conjecture that because dividends are quasi-irreversible 
decisions, firm converge to peer averages gradually, once they are sure that they will be able to 
keep up with their peers.  
We identify the subsample of dividend-paying firms which initiated dividends during our 
sample period, and analyze their payout ratios after the initiation. Because of these restrictions, 
the sample size reduces substantially. Our main explanatory variable of interest is the interaction 
of peer averages of the dividend payout ratio (Peer Div/Assets) and the number of years since the 
firm’s dividend initiation (YearsSinceInitiation).  
Table 9 presents the results in both OLS and 2SLS settings. Column 1 shows the 
regression using OLS. The control variables (not tabulated) are the same as in the baseline 
regressions in Table 5. We find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the 
peer dividend ratio and years since initiation. The main effect of the peer dividend payout ratio is 
positive, but statistically insignificant. Column 2 shows estimates of the second-stage of the 
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2SLS regression. The endogenous explanatory variable in the first stage is the peer average of 
the dividend payout ratio and its interaction with YearsSinceInitiation. The instruments we use 
are our two earlier instruments [Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity 
Risk)] and their interactions with YearsSinceInitiation. This model also obtains a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the instrumented interaction of years since dividend 
initiation and peer dividend ratio. These results suggest that a firm’s dividend payout ratio starts 
to move toward its peer averages gradually over time following dividend initiation. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The question of why firms pay dividends has always baffled financial economists. Many 
firms routinely pay dividends even though it may be an inefficient way to distribute cash to 
stockholders. Even more puzzling, some firms pay dividends even when they don’t have excess 
cash and have to borrow in order to pay dividends. This paper provides one explanation of these 
phenomena, namely peer pressure. Our cross-sectional tests show that peer influence on 
dividends is consistent with the rivalry-based theory of imitation. Peer influence is greater among 
firms that face more intense product market competition and operate in better information 
environments. And firms, especially younger and smaller firms, follow peers that are similar to 
them in size and age. We find parallel and largely consistent results for stock repurchases. 
Moreover, the ability to repurchase shares enables firms to deflect peer pressure to initiate 
dividends, but share repurchases do not significantly affect peer pressure on the amount of 
dividend subsequent to dividend initiation.  
Our findings have several implications for research in finance. For instance, if industry 
peers significantly affect corporate policies, managers may not have as much discretion in setting 
firm policies as the research on managerial behavior suggests. From an asset-pricing standpoint, 
if firms deviate from their fundamentals and mimic their industry peers in paying dividends, our 
findings question the soundness of dividend discount models of equity valuation. From an 
estimation standpoint, the presence of significant correlations between dividend payouts across 
firms in an industry suggests the need for clustering of standard errors at the industry level in 
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firm-level dividend analyses. Broadly, this work contributes to a growing literature that 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
The following table describes the main variables used in the paper. The peer average variable X for 
any firm i in year t is defined as the average X across all firms, except firm i, that share the same 
three-digit SIC code in year t. 
Variable Definition 
Dividend Payer An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays a cash dividend in a given fiscal year, 
and 0 otherwise. From CSRP 
Dividend Initiation An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend in the current year but did 
not pay dividends last year, and 0 otherwise. From CRSP 
Repurchaser An indicator variables that equals 1 if a firm repurchases its stock (PRSTKC>0) in a 
given year, 0 otherwise: From Compustat 
Div/Assets Cash dividend divided by total assets (AT). From CSRP and Compustat 
Repur/Assets Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock PRSTKC/AT. From Compustat 
Total Payout Div/Assets + Repur/Assets 
Sales Growth Annual change in log of sales. From Compustat 
Mkt. to Book (Market Value of Assets/Book Value of Assets) = 
(PRCC_F*CSHPRI+DLC+DLTT+PSTKL-TXDITC)/AT. From Compustat 
R&D/Assets R&D Expenditure/Book Value of Assets = max(0,XRD)/AT. From Compustat 
Log Firm Age Log(current fiscal year – fiscal year of first appearance in Compustat). From Compustat 
Size (NYSE %ile) Fraction of New York Stock Exchange firms with market capitalization less than or 
equal to a given firm in a year 
RE/BE Retained Earnings/Common Equity = RE/CEQ. From Compustat 
Profitability Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by total assets. From Compustat 
Book Leverage (Debt in Current Liabilities + Long Term Debt)/Assets = (DLC+DLTT)/AT 
Cash Flow Risk Standard deviation of cash flow to assets ratio for up to previous 10 years. Cash flow to 
assets ratio= (IB+DP-DV)/AT. From Compustat 
Idios. Equity Shock Residuals obtained from regressions of monthly stock returns over a year on estimated 
loadings on Fama-French and Carhart factors and industry average excess returns, 
compounded each year. From CRSP 
Idios. Equity Risk Log of the standard deviation of residuals obtained from the above model. From CRSP 
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Table 1: Factor regression summary 
The sample consists of monthly returns of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the CRSP-
Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. This table presents the summary statistics of 
estimated parameters of factors obtained from the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four-
factor model, augmented with industry average excess returns as follows: 
௝ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ெ 	ൈ ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ 	ൈ ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ுெ௅ 	ൈ ܪܯܮ௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ெைெ 	ൈ ܯܱܯ௧
൅ ߚ௜௝௧ூே஽ሺ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧ሻ ൅	ߟ௜௝௧																 
where ܴ௜௝௧ refers to the total return for the firm i in industry j over the month t. ܯܭ ௧ܶ is the 
excess market return, ܵܯܤ௧ is the size factor, ܪܯܮ௧ is the book-to-market factor, ܯܱܯ௧ is the 
momentum factor, and ሺ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧ሻ	is the excess return on an equally weighted industry (three-
digit SIC codes) portfolio excluding firm i's return.  
Mean Median S.D. 
∝ෝ௜௝௧ 0.007 0.005 0.062 
ߚመ௜௝௧ெ  0.945 0.922 0.792 
ߚመ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ 0.903 0.726 1.271 
ߚመ௜௝௧ுெ௅ 0.138 0.172 1.306 
ߚመ௜௝௧ெைெ -0.109 -0.081 0.884 
ߚመ௜௝௧ூே஽ -0.049 0.092 3.651 
Obs Per Regression 54 60 11 
R2 0.307 0.288 0.166 
Monthly Return 0.014 0.000 0.177 
Expected Monthly Return 0.013 0.013 0.191 
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Table 2: Relevance of the instrumental variables for dividends 
The table shows estimates from regression models in which peer average idiosyncratic equity shocks (Peer Idios. 
Equity Shock) and idiosyncratic volatilities (Peer Idios. Equity Risk) predict peers’ average future profitability and 
cash flow risks. The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged 
database from 1965 to 2010. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in 
a given year. The models include year and firm fixed-effects. The Appendix provides detailed definition of all these 
variables. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. 
The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses.  ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 







Peer Cash Flow 
Risk(t+1, t+5) 
Peer Idios. Equity Shock 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.010*** -0.008*** 
(30.97) (13.90) (10.75) (-6.12) 
Peer Idios. Equity Risk -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.010*** 0.018*** 
(-15.55) (-8.99) (-5.28) (8.40) 
Peer Profitability 0.302*** 0.146*** 0.075*** -0.086*** 
(27.49) (17.61) (8.66) (-9.67) 
Peer Sales Growth 0.022*** 0.011*** 0.001 0.006* 
(8.95) (4.24) (0.28) (1.74) 
Peer Mkt. to Book -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 0.005*** 
(-6.01) (-13.13) (-13.17) (4.80) 
Peer Log(Firm Age) 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.015*** -0.011*** 
(4.61) (5.62) (4.81) (-3.87) 
Peer Size (NYSE %ile) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000 
(12.84) (7.45) (4.15) (-0.24) 
Peer RE/BE -0.001* -0.000 0.000 0.001** 
(-1.65) (-1.13) (0.78) (2.45) 
Peer Cash Flow Risk 0.194*** 0.161*** 0.082*** -0.063*** 
(16.31) (11.91) (5.05) (-4.91) 
Peer R&D/Assets -0.646*** -0.685*** -0.777*** 0.454*** 
(-17.49) (-15.91) (-16.16) (18.91) 
Constant -0.033*** -0.003 0.009 0.180*** 
(-2.66) (-0.21) (0.53) (13.07) 
N 98270 88813 80539 18323 
Adj. R2 0.333 0.230 0.203 0.366 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in our main analyses. The sample consists of all 
nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. The final sample 
includes about 98,270 firm years, except for dividend initiation which only includes the prior year’s dividend non-
payers. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in a given year. The 
Appendix provides detailed definitions of these variables. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous 
variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. 
Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
Firm Specific Factors      
Dividend Payer 0.466 0.499    
Repurchaser 0.354 0.478    
Div. Initiation 0.035 0.183    
Div/Assets 0.010 0.016 0 0 0.016 
Repur/Assets 0.012 0.035 0 0 0.004 
Total Payout 0.022 0.040 0 0.008 0.027 
Sales Growth 0.087 0.28 -0.013 0.085 0.187 
Mkt. to Book 1.373 1.277 0.687 0.972 1.542 
R&D/Assets 0.035 0.079 0 0 0.035 
Log(Firm Age) 2.686 0.625 2.197 2.708 3.178 
RE/BE -0.04 3.71 0.125 0.568 0.809 
Size (NYSE %ile) 24.814 29.231 1 11 44 
Profitability 0.105 0.16 0.068 0.127 0.184 
Cash Flow Risk 0.068 0.096 0.019 0.034 0.072 
Idios. Equity Shock -0.04 0.702 -0.464 -0.083 0.261 
Idios. Equity Risk 0.132 0.084 0.076 0.109 0.161 
Peer Firm Averages 
Peer Div. Payers 0.435 0.282 0.176 0.4 0.667 
Peer Repurchasers 0.340 0.187    
Peer Div/Assets 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.014 
Peer Repur/Assets 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.015 
Peer Total Payout 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.025 
Peer Sales Growth 0.077 0.117 0.02 0.084 0.141 
Peer Mkt. to Book 1.42 0.762 0.9 1.222 1.695 
Peer R&D/Assets 0.037 0.056 0.001 0.01 0.051 
Peer Log(Firm Age) 2.759 0.34 2.526 2.739 2.979 
Peer RE/BE -0.155 1.365 -0.584 0.33 0.626 
Peer Size (NYSE %ile) 23.12 14.483 13.369 19.533 29.2 
Peer Profitability 0.087 0.1 0.055 0.111 0.149 
Peer Cash Flow Risk 0.07 0.056 0.03 0.05 0.093 
Peer Idios. Equity Shock -0.028 0.258 -0.176 -0.04 0.106 
Peer Idios. Equity Risk 0.14 0.049 0.104 0.131 0.166 
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Table 4: Propensity to pay dividends or to repurchase 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. The Appendix provides detailed 
definitions of all the variables. Columns 1 and 6 show estimates from the first-stage of instrumental variables models, in which the dependent variable is the 
fraction of peers that pay dividends (Peer Div. Payers) and fraction of peers who repurchase shares (Peer Repurchasers), respectively. In both columns 1 and 6, 
the instruments are Lag1(Peer Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk). Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a 
firm in a given year. The dependent variable in column 2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm pays a cash dividend in a given year. In columns 3, 4 
and 5, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether a firm starts paying dividends.  Columns 3, 4 and 5 use the sample of last year’s non-dividend 
payers only. In columns 7, 8 and 9, the dependent variable is whether a firm repurchases shares.  All the models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 






































Peer firm averages          
Instrumented Peer Div. 
Payers  1.090*** 0.532** 0.926*** -0.041  
   
 (6.65) (2.43) (3.22) (-0.12)     
Instrumented Peer 
Repurchasers       0.881*** 0.643** 1.020** 
      (3.50) (1.96) (2.56) 
Peer Sales Growth -0.042*** -0.125* 0.192 0.281* 0.112 -0.060*** -0.005 -0.039 0.066 
(-6.72) (-1.94) (1.60) (1.80) (0.58) (-8.94) (-0.11) (-0.62) (0.80) 
Peer Mkt. to Book 0.013*** 0.075*** 0.000 0.010 -0.001 -0.000 0.005 -0.031* 0.056** 
(6.84) (2.84) (0.01) (0.25) (-0.03) (-0.25) (0.33) (-1.68) (1.96) 
Peer Log(Firm Age) 0.204*** 0.163** 0.083 0.022 0.216* -0.002 -0.128*** -0.189*** -0.104* 
(30.29) (2.26) (1.02) (0.20) (1.67) (-0.43) (-3.66) (-4.49) (-1.85) 
Peer Size (NYSE %ile) 0.002*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.004** 0.000 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.005*** 
(16.62) (-4.83) (-1.44) (-2.16) (0.10) (4.09) (-4.08) (-1.01) (-3.93) 
Peer RE/BE 0.004*** 0.010 -0.017 -0.029** -0.004 0.003*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
(4.06) (1.30) (-1.62) (-1.99) (-0.28) (3.54) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-0.60) 
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Peer Profitability 0.047*** -0.621*** -0.345 -0.616* 0.030 0.331*** 0.040 0.063 0.080 
(2.74) (-2.90) (-1.41) (-1.94) (0.08) (19.83) (0.26) (0.36) (0.27) 
Peer Cash Flow Risk -0.362*** -0.300 0.073 0.362 -0.618 0.264*** 0.696*** 1.089*** 0.396 
(-10.24) (-0.76) (0.16) (0.58) (-0.93) (8.66) (2.91) (3.74) (0.98) 
Peer R&D/Assets -0.299*** -0.500 0.053 0.270 0.057 -0.244*** -0.113 -0.235 0.247 
(-8.99) (-0.88) (0.10) (0.39) (0.07) (-7.91) (-0.39) (-0.75) (0.42) 
Firm-specific factors          
Sales Growth -0.002 -0.330*** -0.086 -0.071 -0.078 -0.002 -0.211*** -0.151*** -0.425*** 
(-1.10) (-9.56) (-1.59) (-1.05) (-0.84) (-1.40) (-10.25) (-6.80) (-8.98) 
Mkt. to Book 0.001 -0.135*** -0.129*** -0.152*** -0.092*** -0.000 -0.015* -0.018** -0.044** 
(1.10) (-7.11) (-6.06) (-5.02) (-3.10) (-0.55) (-1.81) (-2.01) (-2.32) 
R&D/Assets -0.020 -1.754*** -1.699*** -1.960*** -1.450** 0.008 -0.100 -0.160 0.025 
(-1.55) (-3.09) (-3.42) (-2.76) (-2.18) (0.75) (-0.62) (-0.98) (0.05) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.010*** 0.547*** 0.149*** 0.184*** 0.099** -0.003* 0.054*** -0.010 0.066** 
(4.56) (20.20) (5.92) (5.67) (2.53) (-1.89) (3.40) (-0.51) (2.44) 
Size (NYSE %ile) 0.000 0.058*** 0.007 0.019*** -0.009 -0.000 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.046*** 
(0.97) (7.62) (1.34) (2.81) (-1.35) (-1.06) (4.67) (3.40) (3.94) 
RE/BE -0.000*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** -0.000*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
(-3.62) (15.77) (5.02) (4.61) (2.24) (-4.31) (9.39) (8.59) (4.97) 
Profitability -0.015** 4.550*** 2.990*** 3.198*** 2.536*** 0.029*** 1.302*** 1.168*** 1.573*** 
(-2.40) (26.25) (16.77) (13.64) (9.29) (5.34) (17.44) (15.06) (8.43) 
Cash Flow Risk -0.002 -4.594*** -0.614*** -0.625** -0.541 0.012 -0.637*** -0.435*** -0.770** 
(-0.17) (-9.42) (-2.66) (-2.01) (-1.56) (1.43) (-6.09) (-4.15) (-2.19) 
Idios. Equity Shock 0.001 0.063*** 0.130*** 0.154*** 0.097*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 0.023* 
(1.46) (7.64) (8.66) (8.06) (4.00) (-1.20) (-0.27) (-1.12) (1.84) 
Idios. Equity Risk -0.017*** -0.909*** -0.319*** -0.363*** -0.213*** -0.010*** -0.347*** -0.345*** -0.253*** 
(-9.39) (-37.43) (-10.45) (-9.32) (-4.13) (-5.64) (-21.25) (-17.56) (-9.70) 
   




Instrumental Variables    
  
 
   
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity 




(12.25)   (-2.91)    
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity 




(-50.21)   (-23.78)    
N 98270 98270 52413 37231 15182 94728 94728 51642 43086 
Wald test of exogeneity 
(chi2)  6.14** 0.30 2.94* 1.43  3.21* 0.62 2.34 
F-test for the instruments 1268.8***     128.33***    
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Table 5: The amount of payout 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 
to 2010. The Appendix provides detailed definitions of the variables. The dependent variables are total cash 
dividend paid in a year (Div/Assets) or the amount of repurchases (Repur/Assets) scaled by total assets, or the sum of 
the two ratios (Total Payout)). Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm 
in a given year. In Panel A, columns 1 and 2 show the first and second stage estimates, respectively, from an IV-
Tobit regression with Div/Assets as the main dependent variable. Column 3 and 4 show the first and second stages 
of an instrumental variables Tobit (IV-Tobit) regression with Peer Repur/Assets as the main dependent variable. 
Column 5 shows the estimate from the second stage of an IV-Tobit regression with Total Payout as the main 
dependent variable (the first stage is not tabulated). The instruments in all the regressions are Lag1(Peer Idios. 
Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk). Panel B shows estimates from the second stage of two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions in the subsamples of dividend-paying firm-years (column 1) and repurchasing firm-years 
(column 2) only. The models are estimated using the full set of control variables, which are not tabulated. Columns 
1 and 2 show estimates from regressions of Div/Assets and Repur/Assets ratio, respectively, of a firm on the 
instrumented peer averages of the respective ratio.  All the models include year fixed-effects. In Panel C, columns 1 
and 2 of show the second stages of IV-Tobit regressions of Div/Assets using the subsamples of last year’s non-
repurchasers (column 1) and repurchasers (column 2) only. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 show the second stages of 
IV-Tobit regressions of Repur/Assets using the subsamples of last year’s non-dividend payers (column 3) and 
dividend payers (column 4) only. In Panel D, columns 1 and 2 show the second stages of IV-Tobit regressions of 
Div/Assets using the subsamples of firm-years with low dividend premium (column 1) and high dividend premium 
(column 2), based on the time-series median of annual value-weighted dividend premiums; columns 5 and 6 show 
similar regressions of Repur/Assets. Column 3 [7] presents the second stage of a two-stage least squares regression 
of Div/Assets [Repur/Assets], which controls for year x industry fixed effects, where industry is defined by Fama-
French 48 classification. Column 4 [8] presents the second stage of a 2SLS firm-fixed effects regression of 
Div/Assets [Repur/Assets]. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence (industry 
clustering in Panel D, columns 4 and 8), and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Payout in full sample (payers and non-payers) 

















Peer Firm Averages      
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets  0.580***    
 (6.84)    
Instrumented Peer 
Repur/Assets    1.659***  
   (3.98)  
Instrumented Peer Total 
Payout     0.806*** 
    (8.30) 
Peer Sales Growth -0.006*** 0.002 -0.005*** 0.006 0.004** 
(-23.70) (1.38) (-13.67) (1.60) (2.01) 
      
Peer Mkt. to Book 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
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(28.57) (0.72) (13.75) (-3.44) (-4.47) 
Peer Log(Firm Age) 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004* -0.002 
(21.49) (3.64) (-11.04) (-1.73) (-1.29) 
Peer Size (NYSE %ile) 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(11.01) (-7.14) (6.08) (-5.22) (-7.94) 
Peer RE/BE -0.000** 0.000** 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 
(-1.97) (2.47) (1.37) (-1.68) (-1.61) 
Peer Profitability 0.016*** -0.022*** 0.033*** -0.029* -0.033*** 
(20.36) (-5.45) (32.19) (-1.86) (-4.45) 
Peer Cash Flow Risk 0.009*** -0.011* 0.024*** 0.019 0.015 
(6.55) (-1.68) (11.78) (1.21) (1.41) 
Peer R&D/Assets -0.006*** -0.010 0.013*** -0.010 -0.013 
(-4.76) (-0.97) (6.88) (-0.58) (-0.97) 
Firm-specific factors      
Sales Growth -0.000*** -0.014*** -0.000*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
(-4.23) (-21.63) (-2.82) (-14.78) (-19.61) 
Mkt. to Book 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.006*** 
(1.59) (5.74) (1.20) (6.64) (11.10) 
R&D/Assets -0.000 -0.032*** 0.001** 0.002 0.017* 
(-0.88) (-3.28) (1.98) (0.15) (1.83) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.000*** 0.009*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.006*** 
(3.59) (21.17) (-2.58) (0.28) (9.82) 
Size (NYSE %ile) -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(-1.12) (8.86) (-1.26) (4.37) (4.41) 
RE/BE -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(-3.56) (8.70) (-4.14) (10.95) (17.73) 
Profitability 0.000 0.107*** 0.002*** 0.104*** 0.130*** 
(0.81) (33.16) (6.88) (19.44) (27.55) 
Cash Flow Risk 0.001** -0.061*** 0.001* -0.019*** -0.028*** 
(2.12) (-8.14) (1.71) (-2.81) (-4.40) 
Lag1(Idios. Equity Shock) 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 
(1.01) (2.96) (-2.41) (-0.10) (1.02) 
Lag1(Idios. Equity Risk) -0.001*** -0.015*** -0.000*** -0.017*** -0.023*** 
(-9.32) (-33.43) (-4.11) (-18.45) (-34.53) 
Instrumental Variables      
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) 0.0003*** -0.001*** 
(3.77) (-4.77) 
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk) -0.009*** -0.004*** 
(-37.93) (-13.93) 
N 98270 98270 98270 98270 98270 
R2 (Pseudo R2)      
Test of Weak Instruments 
(chi2) 1514.27***  256.92***   
Wald test of exogeneity (chi2)  2.51  7.42*** 16.55*** 
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Panel B: Dividend (repurchase) mimicking by dividend payers (repurchasers) only 
Div/Assets Repur/Assets 
(2SLS – 2nd Stage) (2SLS – 2nd Stage)) 
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets 0.516*** 
(5.87) 
Instrumented Peer Repur/Assets 0.623** 
(2.44) 
N 45761 35110 
Adj. R2 0.382 0.171 
Under-identification Test 539.35*** 161.75*** 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.855 0.801 
 
Panel C: Dividends (repurchases) partitioned by the presence of repurchases (dividends) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Div/Assets Div/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets 
(Non-Repurchasers) (Repurchasers) (Dividend non-payers) (Dividend payers) 
Peer Firm Averages     
Instrumented Peer 
Div/Assets 0.541*** 0.597*** 
 
 
(5.49) (5.08)   
Instrumented Peer 
Repur/Assets  1.569*** 2.074*** 
   (2.96) (3.03) 
N 64026 34244 52413 45857 
  
     Panel D: Effect of dividend premium and firm heterogeneity in mimicking payouts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























Control) (Firm FE) 
Peer Firm Averages         
Instrumented Peer 
Div/Assets 0.729*** 0.415*** 0.263*** 0.191**     
(6.11) (4.83) (4.29) (2.22)     
Instrumented Peer 
Repur/Assets     1.508*** 1.442 0.644** 0.789*** 
     (4.24) (1.03) (2.51) (2.92) 
Firm Fixed Effects    Yes    Yes 
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in peer influence 
The table shows estimates from the second stage of instrumental variable Tobit regressions of Div/Assets or 
Repur/Assets on various subsamples. The models are estimated using the full set of control variables, which are not 
tabulated. In each regression, the peer average dividend ratio and the instrumental variables are calculated within the 
relevant subsample. Panel A shows regressions for subsamples of firms facing high or low product market 
competition, measured using Hoberg and Phillips’ (2016) total similarity measure. The sample of firm-years with 
above [below] median similarity measure within a year is defined as that with high [low] product market 
competition. The sample period is from 1994 to 2010. Panel B presents regressions for subsamples of smaller, 
larger, younger, older, more tangible or less tangible firms, partitioned based on the median market capitalization, 
firm age or asset tangibility. The sample period here is from 1965 to 2010. Panel C shows regressions in subsamples 
of firms with above- or below-median number of industry average analyst coverage or industry average probability 
of informed trading (PIN). The sample period here is from 1993 to 2010 (1990 to 2010) for sample partitions based 
on PIN (number of analysts following). Panel D shows regressions in subsamples of firms with or without a long-
term credit rating by S&P. All models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
within firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Product market competition and payout mimicking 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 










Instrumented Peer Div/Assets 1.289*** 0.698*** 
(2.62) (3.75) 
Instrumented Repur/Assets 1.264** 0.979*** 
(2.27) (2.79) 
N 16925 19245 16925 19245 
 
Panel B: Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility 
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Younger Firms Older Firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets 
Small Peers’ 
Instrumented Div/Assets 0.552* 0.021 
(1.88) (0.94) 
Large Peers’  
Instrumented Div/Assets 0.168*** 0.287*** 
(2.76) (5.51) 
Younger Peers’ 
Instrumented Div/Assets 0.409*** 0.099** 
(2.88) (2.15) 
Older Peers’ 
Instrumented Div/Assets 0.077 0.250*** 
(1.29) (5.31) 
N 29017 27897 31453 34559 19571 19940 35910 36564 
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Panel B (cont.): Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility 
Less Tangible Firms More Tangible Firms 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets Div/Assets 
Less Tangible Peers’ 
Instrumented Div/Assets 
0.230*  -0.035  
(1.96)  (-0.90)  
More Tangible Peers’  
Instrumented Div/Assets 
 0.165***  0.331*** 
 (3.10)  (4.93) 
N 29813 26806 26177 31703 
 
Panel B (cont.): Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility 
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Younger Firms Older Firms 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets 
Small Peers’ 
Instrumented 
Repur/Assets 0.071  0.405***      
(0.06)  (2.98)      
Large Peers’  
Instrumented 
Repur/Assets  0.004  1.260***     
 (0.03)  (6.12)     
Younger Peers’ 
Instrumented 
Repur/Assets     0.292  0.259  
    (0.41)  (0.73)  
Older Peers’ 
Instrumented 
Repur/Assets      0.236  0.889*** 
     (1.10)  (3.75) 
N 29017 27897 31453 34559 19571 19940 35910 36564 
 
Panel B (cont.): Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility 
Less Tangible Firms More Tangible Firms 
(21) (22) (23) (24) 
 Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets 
Less Tangible Peers’ 
Instrumented Repur/Assets -0.486  0.226  
(-0.76)  (1.21)  
More Tangible Peers’  
Instrumented Repur/Assets  0.645  0.693** 
 (0.36)  (2.30) 
N 29813 26806 26177 31703 
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Panel C: Information environment and peer influence 
Industry average 















Instrumented Peer Div/Assets 0.859*** 0.474* 0.494*** 0.940*** 
(4.69) (1.66) (2.59) (4.09) 
N 23931 24639 28318 27934 
 
Panel C (cont.): Information environment and peer influence 
Industry average 















Instrumented Peer Repur/Assets 1.308*** 1.585** 0.804 1.506*** 
(3.60) (2.34) (1.01) (5.20) 
N 23931 24639 28318 27934 
 
Panel D: Financial constraints and payout mimicking 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Div/Assets Div/Assets Repur/Assets Repur/Assets 
 
(Credit 
Rated) (Unrated) (Credit Rated) (Unrated) 
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets 0.988*** 0.619*** 
(5.94) (3.65) 
Instrumented Repur/Assets 1.577*** 1.632*** 
(3.18) (3.53) 
N 16795 48672 16795 48672 
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Table 7: Trends in peer influence on payout 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 
to 2010. The appendix provides detailed definitions of the variables. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are estimates using 
subsamples of data, respectively, from 1965 to 1979 (1970s), from 1980 to 1989 (1980s), from 1990 to 1999 
(1990s), and from 2000 to 2010 (2000s). The dependent variables in Panels A and B, respectively, are total cash 
dividend paid in a year divided by total assets and repurchase dollars divided by total assets. Peer firms are defined 
as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in a given year. All estimates are from the second 
stage of instrumental variables Tobit (IV-Tobit) regressions. The instruments are Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) 
and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk). The models are estimated using a full set of control variables, which are not 
tabulated. All models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm 
dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
IV-Tobit – 2nd Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
 Panel A: Div/Assets 
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets 0.180 0.471*** 1.012*** 0.651*** 
(1.42) (3.85) (5.45) (2.98) 
N 19119 23637 27093 28421 
Panel B: Repur/Assets 
Instrumented Peer Repur/Assets 2.972 0.997 1.944** 1.048*** 
(1.55) (0.80) (2.14) (3.24) 
N 19119 23637 27093 28421 
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Table 8: Announcement effect of quarterly dividend changes and proximity to peer averages 
This table presents regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over three days surrounding quarterly dividend 
announcements (CAR(-1, +1)). The sample consists of all cash dividend paying nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the 
annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. Estimates in this table are aimed at examining how 
the market reacts to corporate dividend changes conditional on where the resulting dividend stacks up relative to 
industry peer dividends.  Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in a 
given year-quarter. The main explanatory variable of interest is the change in total quarterly cash dividends to assets 
ratio (∆Div/Assets). To construct the sub-samples in columns 1 and 2, we first calculate the absolute difference 
between the dividend payout ratio (Div/Assets) of a firm and the average ratio for its peers. Then based on the 
median of such absolute difference, we partition the sample by whether a firm’s dividend payout ratio is close to its 
peers (column 1) or far from them (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 are for the sub-samples of firms which experienced 
an increase in Div/Assets in a given quarter and have dividend payout ratios close to peers (column 3) and far from 
peers (column 4). Samples in columns 5 and 6 are analogous to those in 3 and 4, except that these are within the 
subsample of firms which experienced a decrease in Div/Assets in a quarter. All models include year and quarter 
fixed-effects. In Panel B, we partition the subsamples of dividend increases by double sorting on whether the 
resulting dividend is close to or far from peers (defined above) and high/low dividend premium years (defined in 
Table 5, Panel D). All models include quarter fixed effects. The t- or z-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
within-firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  The last row in each panel shows the Chi-squared test statistic for the difference in the 
coefficient of ∆Div/Assets between columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6). 
Panel A: Samples partitioned by the proximity of dividends to peers and the sign of quarterly Div/Assets changes  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1)  CAR(-1,+1)
Intercept 0.002 0.0096 0.0072 0.0109 -0.0036 0.0108* 
(0.17) (1.27) (0.74) (1.21) (-0.11) (1.66) 
∆Div/Assets 0.9478*** 0.8727*** 1.645*** 0.6737*** 0.2816* 0.3848** 
(8.37) (9.08) (6.36) (4.59) (1.9) (2.59) 
Div/Assets 0.2839*** 0.0635*** 0.1709 0.0913** 0.3059* 0.0111 
(3.23) (2.64) (1.18) (2.2) (1.8) (0.25) 
Peer Div/Assets -0.0899 -0.0072 -0.1592 0.0195 -0.1287 -0.0123 
(-0.9) (-0.21) (-0.99) (0.36) (-0.66) (-0.2) 
Firm Size -0.0001* -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.0007*** -0.0003** -0.0004** 
(-1.68) (-4.05) (-2.47) (-4.84) (-2.3) (-2.35) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 79340 73904 31088 29670 22839 21317 
Chi2-test of diff 
in coeffs. 0.30 11.53*** 0.25 
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Panel B: Sample of Quarterly Div/Assets Increases partitioned by proximity of resulting dividend to peers and size 
of the Dividend Premium 



















Years &  
Far from 
Peers 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
∆Div/Assets 2.4861*** 0.8637*** 1.2387*** 0.6045*** 
(6.85) (4.04) (3.46) (3.23) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,648 12,260 16,440 17,410 
Chi2-test of diff in coeffs.  15.41*** 2.66* 
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Table 9: Do peer effects on dividends increase over time? 
Column 1 (2) shows estimates from OLS regressions (second stage of 2SLS regressions) of Div/Assets ratio of a 
firm.  In column 2, the peer dividend ratio and its interaction is the predicted value from the first-stage regression. 
The sample consists of all dividend-paying nonfinancial, nonutility firms which initiated dividends during the 
sample period, and includes observations during and after the dividend initiation years. The dependent variable is 
total cash dividends paid over a year, divided by total assets (Div/Assets). YearsSinceInitiation is the number of 
years after a firm initiated dividends. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in a firm’s three-digit SIC industry 
code that year. The models are estimated using the full set of control variables (not tabulated) as in Table 5. All 
models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence, and 
are shown in parentheses.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * 





(2SLS – 2nd 
Stage) 
YearsSinceInitiation  
* Peer Div/Assets§ 0.015** 0.023** 
(2.03) (2.35) 
Peer Div/Assets§ 0.089 -0.115 
(1.22) (-0.74) 
   
YearsSinceInitiation -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(-2.64) (-2.79) 
   
N 13,653 13,653 
R2 0.259 0.256 
§ Instrumented in model 2. 
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